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1 The corpus of the subject
There is no evidence to suggest that economists abandon degenerating
programs in the absence of a progressive alternative. (Weintraub, 1985,
p. 148)
For all intents and purposes there is not much use to attack standard economics
because deep in his heart the representative economist long knows that he is tied
to a degenerating research program (see for example Hahn, 1981, p. 1036). The
problem is, rather, that it seems to be exceedingly difficult to build up a convincing
alternative. Keynes, for one, tried and was successful – albeit not fully.
Keynes’s conquest in the 1930s was due to the fact that the neoclassi-
cal theory could not account for the persistent unemployment of that
decade. A generation later, persistent inflation even with less than
full employment was equally decisive in ending Keynes’s supremacy.
(Stigler, 1983, p. 534)
Programmatically Keynes asserted that nothing less than a change of the founda-
tional postulates of economics was needed.
. . . , there is no remedy except to throw over the axiom of parallels and
to work out a non-Euclidean geometry. Something similar is required
to-day in economics. (Keynes, 1973, p. 16)
Keynes’s alternative foundations and his approach to solve the most pressing eco-
nomic problem of his time can be sketched as follows:
Thus we can sometimes regard our ultimate independent variables as
consisting of (1) the three fundamental psychological factors, namely
the psychological propensity to consume, the psychological attitude
to liquidity, and the psychological expectation of the future yield to
capital assets, (2) the wage unit as determined by the bargains reached
between employers and employed, and (3) the quantity of money as
determined by the action of the central bank; so that, if we take as given
the factors specified above, these variables determined the national
income ... and the quantity of employment. (King, 1993, p. 71)
It is obvious that Keynes changed some fundamental behavioral assumptions but he
did not question that economics has to be built upon a behavioral principle or law
of human nature. In this he remained faithful to the methodology of the founding
fathers.
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From the above considerations the following seems to come out as the
correct and complete definition of Political Economy: – "The science
which treats of the production and distribution of wealth, so far as they
depend upon the laws of human nature." Or thus – "The science relating
to the moral or psychological laws of the production and distribution
of wealth." (Mill, 1874, V. 30)
The idea that ‘economics is a science of behaviour or that a science of behaviour is
fundamental to economics’ has been called methodological psychologism (Hudík,
2011, p. 147). What is common to the Classical, the Keynesian, and the Neoclassical
school is the anticipation that an understanding of human behavior leads to an
understanding of how the economy works. The three schools differ in their answer
to the question of what the ultimate law of human nature or behavior looks like. The
actual version is well known:
There is in economics, or at least among the overwhelming majority
of its disciples, broad agreement as to what represents the corpus of
their subject. This corpus revolves around the concept of maximizing
behaviour, whether it be by the individual, firm or institution. (Blaug,
1990, p. 209)
This is the rational variant of psychologism or of what may be better called the
corpus fallacy. It consists in this: From the common sense fact that human behavior
is of overwhelming interest to humans does not logically follow that theoretical
economics should be based upon an assumption about human behavior.
This paper starts from the observation that psychologism has been repeatedly tried
and that it has consistently failed. All variants of psychologism have to be rejected.
The corpus of the subject is not human behavior but the behavior of the monetary
economy. The conceptual consequence is to discard the accustomed subjective-
behavioral axioms and to take objective-structural axioms as the formal point of
departure for the analysis of employment as the main practical issue of economics.
Section 2 first provides the new formal foundations with the set of three structural
axioms. These represent the consumption economy as the most elementary eco-
nomic configuration. The structural axiom set excludes all known nonentities. In
Section 3 the properties of an economy with hyperbolic employment adaptation are
determined as a benchmark. In Section 4 price setting is introduced and employment
is taken as the dependent variable. This systemic configuration produces a positive
feedback loop between wage rate and employment. It produces also a redistribution
of profits between the firms that prevents a spontaneous move towards full employ-
ment. It is shown in detail how the price mechanism and the profit mechanism
interact and that it is the profit mechanism that is crucial for the attainment of full
employment – a point ignored by Keynes because his profit theory was defective.
Section 5 concludes.
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2 General maxim
It is proper that what is assumed in every particular case, should once
for all be brought before the mind in its full extent, by being somewhere
formally stated as a general maxim. (Mill, 1874, V. 46)
The formal foundations of theoretical economics must be nonbehavioral and epit-
omize the interdependence of the real and nominal variables that constitutes the
monetary economy.
2.1 Axioms
The first three structural axioms relate to income, production, and expenditure
in a period of arbitrary length. The period length is conveniently assumed to be
the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have for the beginning one world
economy, one firm, and one product. Axiomatization is about ascertaining the
minimum number of premises.
Total income of the household sector Y in period t is the sum of wage income, i.e.
the product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the
product of dividend D and the number of shares N. Nothing is implied at this stage
about who owns the shares.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working hours.
O = RL |t (2)
The productivity R depends on the underlying production process. The 2nd axiom
should therefore not be misinterpreted as a linear production function.
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P and
quantity bought X .
C = PX |t (3)
The axioms represent the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment, no
foreign trade, and no government.
The economic content of the first three axioms is absolutely transparent. The point
to emphasize is that total income in (1) is the sum of wage income and distributed
profit and not of wage income and profit. To recall, Keynes postulated:
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Thus the factor cost and the entrepreneur’s profit make up, between
them, what we shall define as the total income resulting from the
employment given by the entrepreneur. (Keynes, 1973, p. 23), original
emphasis
The treatment of profit and distributed profit makes all the difference between
good or bad economics (for details see 2013a). Unfortunately, Keynes got the
conceptual basics wrong. It is exactly at this inconspicuous point where the theory
of employment went awry and with it the rest of the General Theory.
2.2 Definitions
Income categories
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side of
the identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms. With (4) wage
income YW and distributed profit YD is defined:
YW ≡WL YD ≡ DN |t. (4)
Definitions add no new content to the set of axioms but determine the logical context
of concepts. New variables are introduced with new axioms.
Key ratios
We define the sales ratio as:
ρX ≡ XO |t. (5)
A sales ratio ρX = 1 indicates that the quantity bought/sold X and the quantity
produced O are equal or, in other words, that the product market is cleared.
We define the expenditure ratio as:
ρE ≡ CY |t. (6)
An expenditure ratio ρE = 1 indicates that consumption expenditures C are equal to
total income Y , in other words, that the household sector’s budget is balanced.
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Monetary profit
Total profit consists of monetary and nonmonetary profit. Here we are at first
concerned with monetary profit. Nonmonetary profit is treated at length in (2011).
The business sector’s monetary profit/loss in period t is defined with (7) as the
difference between the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole identical with
consumption expenditure C – and costs – here identical with wage income YW :
Qm ≡C−YW |t. (7)
Because of (3) and (4) this is identical with:
Qm ≡ PX−WL |t. (8)
This form is well-known from the theory of the firm.
The Profit Law
From (7) and (1) follows:
Qm ≡C−Y +YD |t (9)
or, using the definitions (5) and (6),
Qm ≡
(
ρE − 11+ρD
)
Y
with ρD ≡ YDYW |t.
(10)
The four equations (7) to (10) are formally equivalent and show profit under different
perspectives. The Profit Law (10) tells us that total monetary profit is zero if ρE = 1
and ρD = 0. Profit or loss for the business sector as a whole depends on the
expenditure and distributed profit ratio and nothing else. Total income is the scale
factor.
It is important to realize that neither Adam Smith nor the other founding fathers
developed a correct profit theory (for details see 2013a). The lack of a correct profit
theory since the classicals suffices to make both orthodox and heterodox approaches
unfit for real world application. As Hicks observed correctly:
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Of all the traditional branches of economics, the theory of profits has
had the greatest difficulty in attaining the "safe path of a science." Our
knowledge of the causes determining value, or wages, is indeed incom-
plete; but in these fields we do not find, and have not found for some
considerable time, that fundamental disagreement among competent
writers about the mere direction of approach, or that utter failure of
promising lines of inquiry to yield results of any great importance,
which Kant declared to be the marks of a science still groping in the
dark. (Hicks, 1931, p. 170)
Individual monetary profit
For firm 1 individually eq. (8) reads in the case of market clearing:
Qm1 ≡ P1X1−W1L1
Qm1 ≡ P1R1L1
(
1− W1
P1R1
)
if ρX1 = 1 |t.
(11)
Monetary profit of firm 1 is zero under the condition that the quotient of wage rate,
price, and productivity is unity. This holds independently of the level of employment
or the size of the firm. From the zero profit condition follows:
P1 =
W1
R1
if ρX1 = 1, Qm1 = 0 |t.
(12)
The price of product 1 is, in the simplest case, equal to unit wage costs. This is a
systemic property; human behavior has nothing to do with it.
Retained profit
Once profit has come into existence for the first time (that is: logically – a historical
account is an entirely different matter) the business sector has the option to distribute
or to retain it. This in turn has an effect on profit. This effect is captured by (9) but
it is invisible in (7). Both equations, though, are formally equivalent.
Retained profit Qre is defined for the business sector as a whole as the difference
between profit and distributed profit in period t:
Qre ≡ Qm−YD ⇒ Qre ≡C−Y |t. (13)
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Retained profit is, due to (9), equal to the difference of consumption expenditures
and total income.
Monetary saving
The household sector’s monetary saving is given as the difference of income and
consumption expenditures (for nonmonetary saving see 2011):
Sm ≡ Y −C |t. (14)
In combination with (13) follows:
Qre ≡−Sm |t. (15)
Monetary saving and retained profit always move in opposite directions. This is
the Special Complementarity. It says that the complementary notion to saving is
negative retained profit; positive retained profit is the complementary of dissaving.
There is no such thing as an equality of saving and investment in the consumption
economy, nor, for that matter, in the investment economy (for details see 2013c).
If distributed profit is zero then follows as a corollary of (15):
Qm =−Sm
if YD = 0
|t. (16)
Profit is zero in the limiting case of zero distributed profit and zero saving. Otherwise
profit is equal to dissaving, loss is equal to saving in a given period.
To overlook the complementary relation of saving/dissaving and loss/profit was,
in a sense, the self-implemented central flaw of the classical theory of growth and
distribution.
2.3 Nonentities excluded
Equilibrium in whatever definition is not taken into the premises. Methodologically,
this would amount to a petitio principii (cf. Mill, 2006, pp. 819-827). Not admitted
is, in addition, utility, optimization, and rational expectation. The first rule of theory
building says: never put a behavioral assumption into the premises. The second rule
says: avoid any assumptions that contradict known physical laws. Simultaneity is
a case in point, foreknowledge is another. Finally, the default rule says: avoid the
standard assumptions because they have not worked in the past and will not work in
the future.
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2.4 Logical implications: the market clearing price and the real wage for the
economy as a whole
From (3), (5), and (6) follows the price as dependent variable:
P =
ρE
ρX
W
R
(
1+
YD
YW
)
|t. (17)
This is the general structural axiomatic law of supply and demand for the pure
consumption economy with one firm (for the generalization see 2014). In brief,
the price equation states that the market clearing price, i.e. ρX = 1, is equal to
the product of the expenditure ratio, unit wage costs, and the distributed profit
ratio. All changes of the wage rate, of the productivity, of the average expenditure
ratio, and of the income distribution affect the market clearing price in the period
under consideration. We refer to this formal property as conditional price flexibility
because (17) involves no assumption about human behavior, only the purely formal
condition ρX = 1. Eq. (17) replaces supply-demand-equilibrium.
With (17) the real wage is uno actu given as:
W
P
=
R
ρE (1+ρD)
if ρX = 1 |t.
(18)
The real wage is under the condition of product market clearing equal to the produc-
tivity R if distributed profit is zero, i.e. ρD = 0, and the expenditure ratio is unity, i.e.
ρE = 1. In this limiting case, the wage income recipients get the whole product. If
distributed profit is greater than zero and the expenditure ratio is greater than unity
the real wage is less than the productivity. Under the condition of budget balancing
and market clearing the real wage is determined by the production conditions and
the income distribution (cf. Castle and Hendry, 2014).
The real wage is not determined by supply-demand-equilibrium in the labor market.
The standard labor market theory is false. This conclusion follows in direct lineage
from the objective structural axiom set.
3 Employment, price, and profit
Supply and demand are at the heart of how market economies work.
(Mankiw, 1998, p. 519)
The primitive apparatus of the theory of supply and demand is scientific.
But the scientific achievement is so modest, and common sense and
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scientific knowledge are logically such close neighbors in this case,
that any assertion about the precise point at which the one turned into
the other must of necessity remain arbitrary. (Schumpeter, 1994, p. 9)
Schumpeter obviously had some trouble to convince himself that the familiar supply-
demand-equilibrium has any scientific merits. It has none. We have already seen
that the objective structural law of supply and demand (17) looks very different from
the familiar ‘totem of the micro’ (Leijonhufvud) and that the latter is not applicable
to the labor market. It seems necessary as well as promising to apply some new
economic thinking to labor market theory.
3.1 Hyperbolic adaptation of wage rate and employment
The business sector now consists of two firms that produce different consumption
goods. To simplify matters profit distribution is excluded; the 1st axiom (1) then
turns to:
Y = W1L1︸ ︷︷ ︸
YW1=const.
+ W2L2︸ ︷︷ ︸
YW2=const.
+D1N1︸ ︷︷ ︸
YD1=0
+D2N2︸ ︷︷ ︸
YD2=0
|t. (19)
Labor input, so our first assumption, adapts to changes of the respective labor
supplies. More specific, the employment adaptation is hyperbolic in the period
under consideration, that is, with increasing supply Lθ the wage rate W goes down
and employment L goes up, such that wage income YW remains constant. Vice
versa if the labor supply shrinks. This holds for both firms. Hence, no matter how
the labor supply changes, there is always full employment, and total income does
not change at all. Hyperbolic adaptation is an idealization with some desirable
properties. One of them is that employment changes in one firm do not affect the
other firm provided the expenditure ratios stay put.
With increasing labor input the output of firm 1 increases. From (3), (2), and (6)
follows the price under the condition of market clearing:
P1 =
ρE1Y
R1L1
if ρX1 = 1 |t.
(20)
The market clearing price of firm 1 falls with increasing employment and vice versa.
In perfect analogy one gets for firm 2:
P2 =
ρE2Y
R2L2
if ρX2 = 1 |t.
(21)
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In a growing economy with rising employment the hyperbolic relation between
wage rate and employment makes that the respective market clearing prices (20)
and (21) fall continuously. By consequence, the Laspeyres price index shows that a
growing hyperbolic full employment economy is always deflationary. This effect is
reinforced if the respective productivities increase over time. Note well that total
income and total consumption expenditures remain absolutely constant.
The hyperbolic adaptations do not affect profit as can be immediately inferred from
definition (7):
Qm1 ≡ ρE1Y −YW1 |t. (22)
All variables remain constant independently of employment variations. The same
holds for firm 2. Since their profits do not change the firms are indifferent with
regard to different employment levels.
Full employment is always feasible in the pure consumption economy but depends
on some critical maneuvers: (1) if there is additional supply of labor the wage rate
falls, (2) if the wage rate falls the firm increases employment hyperbolically, (3) the
firm reduces the price hyperbolically in order to sell the additional output, (4) the
firm increases employment despite the fact that profit is the same on all employment
levels.
All in all, this is a tall order, but the last condition is the most critical. Even if wage
rate and price flexibility are perfect there exists, because of profit indifference, no
motive for a firm to increase employment. Something like a behavioral equilibrium
or disequilibrium does not exist.
This point got completely lost in the discussion about sticky wages and prices.
However, this did not matter much because the discussion’s outcome was anyway
inconclusive. The real problem is in any case ‘sticky’ profit; and this means that
an intrinsic economic drive towards full employment is lacking. The long standing
assertion that full employment or something rather close to it is the outcome of
the spontaneous working of the price mechanism is untenable. So far, Keynes’s
fundamental critique of what he called classicals was fully justified. Even with a
perfect flexibility of wage rates and prices all employment levels are indifferent
from the firms’ perspective. Therefore, as a matter of principle, the unhindered
and efficient working of the price mechanism does not guarantee full employment.
The key problem at this point of the analysis is the employment indifference of the
business sector.
3.2 Nonhyperbolic adaptation of wage rate and employment
In the general case, the product of wage rate and employment does not remain
constant. With profit distribution still kept out of the picture the 1st axiom now
reads:
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Y =W1L1 +W2L2 +D1N1︸ ︷︷ ︸
YD1=0
+D2N2︸ ︷︷ ︸
YD2=0
|t. (23)
Analogous to (20) the market clearing price is given by:
P1 =
ρE1
(
W1 +W2
L2
L1
)
R1
if ρX1 = 1, YD = 0 |t.
(24)
The first thing to notice is that the market clearing price of firm 1 is no longer
independent from what happens in firm 2. In the general case, the markets are
entangled. By consequence we have for the market clearing price of firm 2:
P2 =
ρE2
(
W2 +W1
L1
L2
)
R2
if ρX2 = 1, YD = 0 |t.
(25)
Let us assume that the labor supply of firm 1 increases and that W1 falls as a reaction.
In contradistinction to the hyperbolic case the firm does not react with an increase
of employment L1. From (24) and (25) then follows that the market clearing prices
in both firms decline if all other variables are unchanged. Firm 2 is affected because
total income falls and with it the nominal demand C2. The respective expenditure
ratios remain unchanged.
From (11) follows for the profit of firm 1:
Qm1 ≡ ρE1Y −W1L1 |t. (26)
In more detail this gives after substitution of (1) and rearrangement
Qm1 ≡ ρE1W2L2− (1−ρE1)W1L1 |t (27)
and analogous for firm 2
Qm2 ≡ ρE2W1L1− (1−ρE2)W2L2 |t. (28)
According to (27), the reduction of the wage rate W1 increases the profit of firm 1
and according to (28) it decreases the profit of firm 2. If employment follows profit
then it is up in firm 1 and down in firm 2. An employment expansion that falls short
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of being hyperbolic does not eliminate unemployment but only spreads it to the rest
of the economy.
However, this process cannot last for long if profit has been zero in the initial period.
In this limiting case firm 2 makes a loss as a consequence of the wage rate reduction
in firm 1. If nothing else changes the bankruptcy of firm 2 is only a question of time.
An obvious remedy is a wage cut that restores the initial zero profit configuration.
Both firms then end up with lower wage rates and lower market clearing prices. The
overall employment effect of a nonhyperbolic wage rate reduction in one firm is, in
the final analysis, negligible.
3.3 Crossover adaptation
The profit equations (27) and (28) point to an improbable but feasible behavioral
combination that results in higher employment in firm 1 without adverse effects in
the rest of the economy.
It is assumed that firm 1 raises employment at the going wage rate. Taken in
isolation, this move reduces profit in firm 1 and boosts profit in firm 2. However, a
parallel wage increase in firm 2 has the opposite effect. Hence, in combination both
effects cancel out. Total income and total consumption expenditures increase. The
partitioning of total expenditures, which is determined by the expenditure ratios,
remains unchanged.
Compared to the hyperbolic adaption, the deflationary effect of the crossover adapta-
tion is much smaller. This is an advantage. It is obvious, though, that the behavioral
sequence that defines the crossover adaptation hardly ever occurs spontaneously.
4 Employment as dependent variable
. . . Keynesian agents are inherently price setters, not price takers.
(Gordon, 1990, p. 1136)
. . . observable economic events derive ultimately not from unspecified
coordinating mechanisms, whether invisible hands, price systems, or
neo-Walrasian “auctioneers”, but . . . from definable actions of real
people. (Clower, 1998, p. 410)
It is not some mysterious entity that sets the price, it is someone in the firm who
sets the price. Of course, the price setter in a small firm faces different business
conditions compared to the price setter in a giant firm, nevertheless it is in any case
a person and not “the market” who sets the price. To take the price as dependent
variable that clears the market is an analytical idealization; it is not a description of
real world price setting. Therefore, it is a separate question whether conditional price
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flexibility as introduced in Section 2.4 is at all justified or at least as a convenient
approximation.
In order to analyze the logical alternative to conditional price flexibility, we now
change the direction of dependency and take the price as independent variable.
Thereby, the firm becomes the price setter. Analogous to the derivation of eq. (20)
the price is at first given in general form, i.e. before the application of the condition
of market clearing, as:
P1 =
ρE1
ρX1
Y
R1L1
|t. (29)
We now invert the dependency and have employment as the dependent variable:
L1 =
ρE1
ρX1
Y
P1R1
|t. (30)
This equation says that, with given expenditure ratio ρE1 and given total income Y ,
the relationship between price P1 and quantity X1 is hyperbolic. From this then
follows the inverse relationship between price and employment. It should be clear
that any nonhyperbolic relationship can be represented by a combination of a
hyperbolic adaptation and a change of the partitioning of the overall expenditure
ratio. For the time being, the partitioning remains unaltered.
Under the condition of market clearing we get in greater detail:
L1 =
W2L2 +YD
P1R1
ρE1
−W1
if ρX1 = 1 |t.
(31)
Employment in firm 1 is positively affected by an increase of wage income in firm 2,
by an increase of total distributed profit, by an increase of the expenditure ratio and
by an – increase – of the wage rate W1. At a constant price the higher wage rate is
translated into higher nominal demand and ultimately into higher employment. If
wage rate and price rise in step the effect on employment is nil. For an expansive
employment effect the wage rate must rise faster than the price. If it is the other way
round then we have inflation and growing unemployment. In other words, eq. (31)
accounts also for stagflation (for details see 2012)
Within the accustomed framework of supply-demand-equilibrium the correlation of
higher wage rate and higher employment is counter-intuitive. Against this it has to
be pointed out that intuition is utterly misleading in a framework with price setting.
The Keynes-specific case is also covered by (31). An increase of the expenditure
ratio ρE1 that is not counteracted by a price or productivity increase boosts employ-
ment L1. In the pure consumption economy, demand management is, as a matter of
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course, restricted to variations of the expenditure ratios ρE1 and ρE2 (for the general
investment multiplier see 2012, Sec. 6).
We have analogous for firm 2:
L2 =
W1L1 +YD
ρX2P2R2
ρE2
−W2
|t.
(32)
An increase of the wage rate in firm 1 has not only a positive effect on firm 1’s
employment but also on firm 2’s. Mutatis mutandis for a wage rate increase in firm 2.
Therefore, both firms together constitute a positive feedback loop that may go on
for a considerable time depending on the availability of labor supply. Simultaneous
adaptations of L1 and L2 are thereby excluded because of physical impossibility.
Firm 2 acts as a circuit breaker if the sales ratio, the price, or the productivity in the
denominator of (32) increases in step with firm 1’s wage income in the numerator.
An increase of the sales ratio ρX means that an additional nominal demand is
satisfied by running down the inventory. By consequence, there is no effect on
employment in the current period. If L2 in (32) does not increase there is no positive
effect on L1 in the following period in (31). If unemployment has been reduced to
zero and inventories have been depleted firm 2 has no alternative but to break the
feedback loop with an increase of P2. In this case the employment effect is entirely
confined to firm 1.
The interaction of (31) and (32) means that an increase of the wage rate in one firm
can trigger a multiplier process that increases employment in both firms. A wage cut
has the opposite effect. This is the crucial difference to the hyperbolic adaptation of
Section 3.1.
From (11) follows for firm 1’s monetary profit:
Qm1 ≡ (P1R1−W1)L1
if ρX1 = 1 |t.
(33)
In combination with (31) this yields:
Qm1 ≡ P1R1−W1P1R1
ρE1
−W1
W2L2
if ρX1 = 1, YD = 0 |t.
(34)
The quotient declines with increasing W1, that is, the firm’s profit shrinks with an
increase of the wage rate. On the other hand, the profit of firm 2 increases with W1.
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Qm2 ≡ P2R2−W2P2R2
ρE2
−W2
W1L1
if ρX2 = 1, YD = 0 |t.
(35)
In the simplest case, i.e. ρE ≡ ρE1 + ρE2 = 1 and ρD = 0, total profit is zero
according to the Profit Law (10). If, in addition, zero profit for both firm holds
according to (12) then with an increase of the wage rate W1 firm 1 makes a loss
and firm 2 makes a profit of equal magnitude. If initial profits of both firms have
been positive, i.e. ρE > 1 and/or ρD > 0, then the profit of firm 1 shrinks and that of
firm 2 grows.
While the profit of the business sector as a whole does, in the elementary case
ρE = 1, ρD = 0, in no way depend on the wage rate, it does indeed so for a single
firm. Therefore it is difficult to get the positive feedback loop going with only
one firm, because this presupposes that the firm accepts a lower profit, at least in
the initial period. Things are entirely different if the two firms that are formally
represented by (34) and (35) move in step. In the ideal case, this leaves profits
of both firms unchanged. This lockstep effect, however, is probably beyond the
comprehension of myopic rationality. Or, if comprehended, it is hardly acceptable
for a firm to make the first step. Since individual rationality stands in the way of
an overall improvement only a coordinated action can get the positive wage rate
multiplier going. This action includes that the firms refrain from price increases.
Seen from the economy as a whole, the situational logic would in the case of overall
unemployment demand that the firms promote or at least accept wage rate increases
at constant prices. This is strongly at odds with the myopic logic of the firm. The
emotional involvements have been nicely portrayed by Adam Smith.
Our merchants and master-manufacturers complain much of the bad
effects of high wages in raising the price, and thereby lessening the sale
of their goods both at home and abroad. They say nothing concerning
the bad effects of high profits. They are silent with regard to the
pernicious effects of their own gains. They complain only of those of
other people. (Smith, 1904, I. 9.24)
Because of this, the economy will not spontaneously move towards full employment,
neither in the short nor in the long run. The real problem is not the downward
stickiness of the wage rate but its upward stickiness. The economic Pavlovian reflex
– price down/quantity up – does not work for the labor market as a whole. The
structural reason is that the labor markets are not on the same plane with the product
markets, but orthogonal to them. Walras’s law does not extend to the labor markets
(for details see 2013b). From this in turn follows that supply-demand-equilibrium is
not the proper one-fits-all analytical tool.
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Let us assume that firm 2, which may stand here for the rest of the economy, has
absorbed the whole labor supply and is fully employed at Lθ2 . Unemployment is
confined to firm 1, which may stand here for a whole sector. Under the condition of
zero profit distribution eq. (21) simplifies to:
L1 =
W2Lθ2
P1R1
ρE1
−W1
if ρX1 = 1, YD = 0 |t.
(36)
This opens three avenues in a price setter economy for a movement from partial
unemployment to overall full employment. First, via the wage rate. The requisite
higher wage rate is, in dependence of the move to higher full employment labor
input Lθ1 , given by:
W1 =
P1R1
ρE1
−W2 L
θ
2
L1
if ρX1 = 1, YD = 0 with L1→ Lθ1 |t.
(37)
The move to full employment reduces profit according to (34). In firm 2 price and
profit increase according to (25) and (35).
The firm as sovereign price setter may reduce the price in order to increase sales
hyperbolically and thereby ultimately employment. The requisite lower price is, in
dependence of the higher full employment labor input Lθ1 , given by:
P1 =
ρE1
R1
(
W1 +W2
Lθ2
L1
)
if ρX1 = 1, YD = 0 with L1→ Lθ1 |t.
(38)
The redistribution of profits between the firms is analogous to the wage rate increase.
Since P1 falls and P2 rises the effect on the price level is indefinite. The psychological
hindrance inherent in this alternative is that it is not logically cogent for firm 1 to
reduce price and profit in order to reduce unemployment. There is no spontaneous
tendency to establish full employment. Instead, the firm will plead for a wage
reduction and it can count on economists for support:
We economists have all learned, and many of us teach, that the rem-
edy for excess supply in any market is a reduction in price. If this is
prevented by combinations in restraint of trade or by government regu-
lations, then those impediments to competition should be removed. Ap-
plied to economy-wide unemployment, this doctrine places the blame
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on trade unions and governments, not on any failure of competitive
markets. (Tobin, 1997, p. 11)
With price reduction is meant, in the given context, a reduction of the the wage rate.
What all economists have learned and many teach is false. If implemented, the po-
litical advice of the representative economist regularly deteriorates the employment
situation. The physician is worse than the illness.
Finally, the Keynesian way requires a higher expenditure ratio which is established
by:
ρE1 =
P1R1
W1 +W2
Lθ2
L1
if ρX1 = 1, YD = 0 with L1→ Lθ1 |t.
(39)
In this case, too, the positive employment effect will spill over to the rest of the
economy. The multiplier works, of course, also in the pure consumption economy
without investment. The investment multiplier is only a bit more involved but not
different in principle (for details see 2012, Sec. 6).
With regard to profit we have to discriminate between three configurations. Let us
start with an initial zero profit situation, i.e. ρE ≡ ρE1 +ρE2 = 1 and ρD = 0. In
this case, an increase of ρE1 makes that the profit of the business sector as a whole
is greater than zero. The exact distribution of profit between the firms due to the
multiplier effect can be left open for the moment. The dissaving or deficit spending
of the households has a positive effect on employment according to (36).
Second, let us assume that in the initial period profit for the business sector as a
whole has been already greater than zero, i.e. ρE > 1 and ρD = 0. In this case, an
increase of ρE1 makes that the profit of the business sector as a whole increases.
The third configuration involves an initial loss for the business sector as a whole, i.e.
ρE < 1 and ρD = 0. In this case, an increase of ρE1 reduces the overall loss or even
turns it into overall profit. Given this initial configuration, there is no alternative
to Keynesian measures. What has to be done first is to bring back the economy at
least to overall zero profit. If the household sector does not spontaneously return to
a configuration of, at minimum, ρE = 1 and ρD = 0 then this impulse must come
from outside. In the pure consumption economy with zero distributed profit the
overall expenditure ratio must not fall below unity for any length of time. In a
situation with prolonged saving of the household sector, i.e. ρE < 1, wage rate or
price changes are pointless. The price mechanism redistributes profit and loss but
does not generate overall profit. And there is no guarantee that the expenditure ratio
and the distributed profit ratio spontaneously produce the amount of profit that the
economy needs for a proper functioning. The distinction between short and long run
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is beside the point because with losses for the economy as a whole there is no long
run. It is the profit mechanism, which is governed by ρE and ρD, that determines the
fate of the economy and not the price mechanism. Hayek’s marvel about allocation
(1945, p. 527) has been and still is utterly naive.
Keynes was right, there is nothing in the economy to automatically prevent a
shortfall of overall demand that lasts long enough to jeopardize the economy. There
is no forceful reason why the configuration ρE < 1 and ρD = 0 should not last for
several periods. Yet this means loss for the economy as a whole over several periods
and ultimately the bankruptcy of some firms. This in turn increases unemployment.
Therefore, the first thing to do is to bring back the overall expenditure ratio to unity.
This, however, may not be sufficient because overall zero profit is compatible with
profit for some firms and losses for others. This changes the problem situation from
an overall demand deficit to the distribution of overall profit among firms. The
problem of profit distribution among the sectors of the economy is different from
the distribution of unemployment among the sectors. An increase of the expenditure
ratio always eases the problem but in order to achieve overall full employment wage
rates and product prices have to be selectively adapted. The ideal outcome would
be an expenditure ratio of unity on the average and a configuration of wage rate
and price in each sector that enables full employment. It is not to be expected that
the whole adaptation process happens spontaneously. The simple reason is that
adaptations that necessitate a profit reduction will not spontaneously be carried out
by the individual firms.
In a price setter economy, also known as real world, an increase of the wage rate
increases employment. Since downward flexibility of the wage rate does not elimi-
nate unemployment, wage stickiness cannot explain unemployment. Insufficient
overall demand, expressed by an expenditure ratio of less than unity, or downward
stickiness of profit can. It is not true that the unhindered working of the price
mechanism, as formally embodied in supply-demand-equilibrium, is sufficient for
establishing full employment. This starting point of Keynes’s employment theory
was correct, but then things went wrong because he could not get the profit theory
right.
His Collected Writings show that he wrestled to solve the Profit Puzzle
up till the semi-final versions of his GT but in the end he gave up and
discarded the draft chapter dealing with it. (Tómasson and Bezemer,
2010, pp. 12-13, 16)
Keynes’s intended theoretical revolution could not succeed because the Keynesian
and the Walrasian approach share the same error with regard to the two funda-
mental economic concepts income and profit. The overdue scientific revolution in
economics has to get rid of both approaches.
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5 Conclusion
It is there [in the principles course] that we distill our profession’s
accumulated knowledge and teach our fellow citizens how to better
understand the world in which they live. (Mankiw, 1998, p. 519)
Why, indeed, is economics not yet a science – in the sense of repre-
senting a body of knowledge that grows cumulatively over time and
has something of value to teach men and women of practical affairs?
(Eichner, 1983, p. 508)
It is somewhat ironic that teachers who do not understand how the economy works
profess that they help their fellow citizens to better understand the world. What
exactly is the accumulated knowledge of the profession? General equilibrium
theory? Or the tenet that wages must fall in order to restore full employment? There
is more error in standard economics than knowledge.
Standard economics is built on indefensible premises. The best methodological rule
therefore says: avoid the standard assumptions because they have not worked in the
past and will not work in the future.
In the present paper, the standard subjective-behavioral axioms are replaced by
objective-structural axioms. The new formal foundations are transparent and testable.
All known nonentities are excluded.
The main results of the structural axiomatic analysis of employment are:
• The real wage is not determined by supply-demand-equilibrium in the labor
market. The standard labor market theory is false.
• Even if wage rate and price flexibility are perfectly hyperbolic in the pure
consumption economy, there exists because of profit indifference no motive
for a firm to increase employment.
• It is in any case a person and not “the market” who sets the price. Analytically,
the price is the independent variable and employment the dependent variable.
• In a price setter economy, also known as the real world, an increase of
the wage rate increases employment. At a constant price the higher wage
rate is translated into higher nominal demand and ultimately into higher
employment.
• Since downward flexibility of the wage rate does not eliminate unemployment,
wage stickiness cannot explain unemployment. Insufficient overall demand,
expressed by an expenditure ratio of less than unity, or downward stickiness
of profit can.
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• It is not true that the unhindered working of the price mechanism is sufficient
for establishing full employment.
• Keynes was right, there is nothing in the economy to automatically prevent a
shortfall of overall demand that lasts long enough to jeopardize the economy.
• Keynes got the conceptual basics wrong. The Keynesian and the Walrasian
approach share the same error with regard to the two fundamental economic
concepts income and profit.
• It is the profit mechanism that determines the fate of the economy and not the
price mechanism.
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